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 Informed by a feminist analysis, the author examines a 
new development in the legal responses to workplace sexual 
harassment in Quebec. Sexual harassment has been recognized 
as a psychological injury, compensable through the province’s 
Commission des accidents de travail. This classification was 
confirmed in the Béliveau-St-Jacques case, in which an alleged 
victim of workplace sexual harassment filed a civil suit seeking 
damages from her employer based on both the civil liability 
regime and the antidiscrimination and anti-harassment clauses 
of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The 
Supreme Court of Canada found that Quebec’s Act Respecting 
Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases (“AIAOD”) 
extinguishes the right to all civil remedies for workplace 
injuries, including punitive damages in cases of intentional and 
illegal violations of a protected right. This approach was 
subsequently entrenched in the new psychological harassment 
provisions of the Labour Standards Act. 
 The author discusses the implications of Béliveau-St-
Jacques for victims of sexual harassment, particularly women. 
While the decision goes far in recognizing the systemic nature 
of sexual harassment in the workplace, it also somewhat 
illogically includes violations of fundamental rights within the 
ambit of “occupational hazards.” Responding to sexual 
harassment through the no-fault workplace compensation 
scheme causes the distress and anguish experienced by sexual 
harassment victims to be assessed as a medical condition. 
Women become the objects of an administrative regime that 
causes them to suffer further affronts to their dignity. The 
author contrasts the legal treatment of sexual harassment with 
that of a different harm to dignity—defamation, which 
constitutes a narrow exception to the exclusion of civil 
remedies under the AIAOD. 
L’auteur, inspiré par une analyse féministe, étudie une 
nouvelle addition à l’arsenal juridique disponible aux victimes 
de harcèlement sexuel au travail au Québec. Depuis 1996, le 
harcèlement sexuel a été reconnu comme un dommage 
psychologique, duquel la victime peut être indemnisée par la 
voie d’un recours devant la Commission des accidents du 
travail. Cette classification trouve sa source dans l’affaire 
Béliveau-St-Jacques, dans laquelle une personne, supposément 
victime de harcèlement sexuel au travail, a entamé une 
poursuite judiciaire contre son employeur en se basant sur le 
régime de responsabilité civile et les clauses anti-
discriminatoires et anti-harcèlement de la Charte québécoise 
des droits et libertés. La Cour suprême du Canada a statué que 
la Loi sur les accidents du travail et les maladies 
professionnelles du Québec privait la victime de tout droit à 
une réparation pour les dommages subis basée sur le régime de 
responsabilité civile, incluant tout dommage punitif pour une 
atteinte illicite et intentionnelle à un droit garanti par la Charte. 
Par la suite, cette approche a été solidifiée dans les nouvelles 
dispositions de la Loi sur les normes du travail visant le 
harcèlement psychologique. 
 L’auteur discute des implications de l’arrêt Béliveau-St-
Jacques pour les victimes de harcèlement sexuel, 
particulièrement les femmes. Bien que l’arrêt reconnaisse la 
nature systémique du harcèlement sexuel au travail, il classifie 
également, quelque peu illogiquement, les violations de droits 
fondamentaux dans la catégorie des «accidents du travail». 
Tenter de redresser les dommages du harcèlement sexuel par le 
biais d’un système de compensation des accidents du travail 
sans égard à la faute mène à l’évaluation de la souffrance des 
victimes en tant que condition médicale. Par ce fait, les femmes 
deviennent les objets d’un régime administratif les obligeant à 
subir de nouvelles atteintes à leur dignité. L’auteur contraste le 
traitement juridique du harcèlement sexuel avec un type 
différent d’atteinte à la dignité : la diffamation, qui constitue 
une exception restreinte à l’exclusion des réparations basées sur 
le régime de responsabilité civile. 
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 In 1987, Catharine MacKinnon remarked: “Sexual harassment, the event, is not 
new to women. It is the law of injuries that it is new to.”1 In Quebec, almost twenty 
years later, a new development in legal responses to sexual harassment has emerged. 
Sexual harassment is a workplace injury. It is the consequences of this development 
and the assumptions about women and their bodies that underpin it that I will explore 
in what follows.  
 I begin with a historical overview of the workplace accident regime in place in 
the province of Quebec, paying particular attention to the treatment of psychological 
injuries in relation to the civil law category of moral damages. I then provide a critical 
reading of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Béliveau-St-Jacques v. 
Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc.,2 in which it was 
decided that the statutory compensation regime displaces the remedies that would 
otherwise be available to victims of workplace sexual harassment under Quebec’s 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.3 
 My reading of the Béliveau-St-Jacques decision forms the basis of a feminist 
critique of the workplace accident compensation scheme. The critique mobilizes 
Michel Foucault’s concept of a disciplinary discourse that regulates individuals, in 
order to make the argument that the compensation system is part of an administrative 
apparatus that symbolically and materially constitutes women in such a way that their 
emotional life is inseparable from their bodies. 
 In the final section, I interrogate the only currently accepted exception to the 
displacement of Quebec Charter remedies established in Béliveau-St-Jacques: 
damage to reputation. This exception, I argue, bolsters my earlier claims about the 
workplace accident compensation regime, in that it allows compensation for a 
uniquely un-embodied harm. 
 
1 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987) at 103 [MacKinnon, Feminism]. MacKinnon was among the first to argue that tort law provides 
an inadequate legal response to sexual harassment and that a statutory antidiscrimination scheme 
would better protect victims of sexual harassment. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment 
of Working Women (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979) [MacKinnon, Harassment].  
2 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345, 136 D.L.R (4th) 129 [Béliveau-St-Jacques cited to S.C.R.]. 
3 R.S.Q. c. C-12 [Quebec Charter]. 
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I. Historical Background 
A. The Workplace Accident Compensation Scheme 
 The Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases4 constitutes 
a no-fault regime similar in nature to an insurance scheme. The first step in the 
scheme’s creation was the 1909 adoption of the Act respecting the responsibility for 
accidents suffered by workmen in the course of their work, and the compensation for 
injuries resulting therefrom.5 This act withdrew workplace accidents from the general 
law of civil responsibility, which was unsuited to the problems posed by 
industrialization.6 The concept of fault was replaced with the notion of “occupational 
risk”, described by one commentator as “[l]e résultat d’un compromis social 
historique entre des forces contradictoires.”7 Workers were relieved of the burden of 
showing that their employers were at fault for injuries sustained in the workplace. In 
exchange, they renounced the right to full compensation, receiving instead a partial 
indemnity, the cost of which was distributed across employers. 
 In 1928, application of the scheme was dejudicialized with the creation of the 
Commission des accidents de travail (“CSST”).8 The accident fund, consisting of 
employer contributions, became the source of indemnification in 1931 with the 
passing of the Act Respecting Workplace Accidents.9 After more than fifty years of 
relative stability, the regime underwent a major revision in 1985.10 
B. Compensation for Psychological Injuries 
 Unlike in the common law,11 psychological injury has not historically been 
problematized in the civil law tradition. Thus, rather than basing compensation for 
harm on a Cartesian view of the self, in which body and mind are treated as radically 
distinct aspects of personhood justifying differential treatment by the law, the subject 
 
4 R.S.Q. c. A-3.001 [AIAOD]. 
5 S.Q. 1909, c. 66. 
6 See generally Jean-Louis Baudouin & Patrice Deslauriers, La responsabilité civile, 6th ed. 
(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2003) at paras. 941-45. See also Katherine Lippel, Le droit des 
accidentés du travail à une indemnité: analyse historique et critique (Montreal: University of 
Montreal, 1986); Béliveau-St-Jacques, supra note 2 at 398; Jean-Claude Paquet, “L’affaire Béliveau-
St-Jacques: L’équilibre entre l’integrité du régime de réparation des lésions professionnelles et le droit 
à des dommages exemplaires en vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne” in 
Développements récents en droit de la santé et sécurité au travail (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 
1997) 121. 
7 Paquet, ibid. at 131. 
8 Béliveau-St-Jacques, supra note 2. 
9 S.Q. 1931, c. 100. 
10 Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.Q. c. A-3. 
11 See e.g. Joanne Conaghan & Wade Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort, 2d ed. (London: Pluto, 1999) at 
34-44. 
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of the civil law is an organic whole bearing “personality rights” whose integrity is 
recognized as inviolable.12 Commission of a civil fault entails liability for reparation 
of the injury caused, whether it is “bodily, moral, or material.”13 
 Early doctrinal treatment of European workplace accident legislation in civilian 
jurisdictions14 illustrates that developing compensation schemes recognized 
psychological injury, despite textual reference to “l’intégrité ou à la santé du corps 
humain.”15 The flexible concept of “moral damages” was consequently not transposed 
without adaptation. Instead, psychological injury related to workplace accidents was 
described in medical terms, viewing the brain rather than the mind as the site of 
damage. Thus, “[l]a folie est une altération du cerveau, un traumatisme, au même titre 
que la rupture d’un muscle, la perforation d’une artère ou la fracture d’un os.”16 As a 
corollary, moral injuries were described as medical conditions such as dementia, 
hysteria, hypochondria, neurasthenia, et cetera.17 
 Despite this historical willingness to recognize psychological injuries within the 
framework of workplace accident compensation schemes, acceptance of claims based 
on harassment came relatively late in Quebec.18 Early jurisprudence often dealt with 
the traumatic effects of witnessing violence (as in the case of police officers19 and 
prison guards20), though illnesses resulting from a work environment poisoned by 
harassment were the basis of at least some of the early claims.21 
 The first case in which a psychological injury caused by workplace harassment 
was indemnified was decided in 1984.22 The appeal board of the CSST eventually 
 
12 See e.g. art. 4 C.C.Q. 
13 Art. 1457 C.C.Q. 
14 See e.g. Adrien Sachet, Traité théorique et pratique de la législation sur les accidents du travail, 
t. 1, 6th ed. (Paris: Sirey, 1921) for an analysis of Austrian, German, Swiss, and French legislation. 
15 Ibid. at paras. 256, 266 [emphasis added]. 
16 Ibid. at para. 265. 
17 See ibid. 
18 See generally Reine Lafond, “L’indemnisation des lésions psychologiques liées au travail: 
dernières tendances” in Développements récents en droit de la santé et sécurité au travail 
(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1997) 245. 
19 See e.g. Bouchard c. Sûreté du Québec, [1988] C.A.L.P. 702. 
20 See e.g. Linch c. Canada (Ministère du Solliciteur générale), [1987] C.A.L.P. 590. 
21 See e.g. Re Leduc (1983), Longueuil 2335 (BRCSST), cited in Maurice Drapeau, Le harcèlement 
sexuel au travail (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1991) at 192; Re Nadeau (1986), Côte Nord 8023 
195 (BRCSST). For an exhaustive review of the jurisprudence, see Bernard Cliche et al., Le 
harcèlement et les lésions psychologiques (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005). 
22 Leduc c. Les Centres d’accueil du Haut St-Laurent (1982), 8518466 (BRCSST), cited in 
Katherine Lippel, “Droit et statistiques : réflexions méthodologiques sur la discrimination systémique 
dans le domaine de l’indemnisation pour les lesions professionnelles” (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 362 at 370, 
n. 22. See also Status of Women Canada, L’accès à la justice pour des victimes de harcèlement 
sexuel : l’impact de la décision Béliveau-St-Jacques sur les droits des travailleuses à l’indemnisation 
pour les dommages by Katherine Lippel & Diane Demers (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) 
at 17. But see Accidents du travail—76, [1983] C.A.S. 641, cited in Drapeau, ibid. at 192-93 (where 
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confirmed that workplace harassment could lead to a psychological injury justifying 
indemnification in 1988.23  
II. Béliveau-St-Jacques 
A. Background 
 In Béliveau-St-Jacques, the Supreme Court pronounced on the fit between the 
AIAOD, the droit commun24 of the civil law, and the Quebec Charter. The result, as 
has often been remarked,25 was to introduce as much confusion as clarity in situating 
cases of psychological injury generally, and sexual harassment specifically. 
 Ms. Béliveau-St-Jacques claimed that she had been the victim of sexual 
harassment in her workplace, perpetrated both by her immediate supervisor and by 
her employer, who refused to believe her complaints regarding the matter and 
eventually fired her. Allegedly, as a consequence of the initial harassment and her 
employer’s actions, Ms. Béliveau-St-Jacques suffered from (what was diagnosed as) 
anxiety, insomnia, and asthenia. She filed for compensation with the CSST and was 
rejected. A review board found her eligible for compensation, but by that time, Ms. 
Béliveau St-Jacques had already filed a civil suit in the Superior Court seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
 The civil suit was based on the civil liability regime of the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada26 as well as sections 10 and 10.1 of the Quebec Charter, which are the anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment clauses respectively. Compensatory damages 
were sought for moral harm, injury to physical and psychological health, and lost 
wages. Punitive damages were sought under the second paragraph of section 49 of 
the Quebec Charter, which provides for them in case of intentional and illegal 
violation of an enumerated right. 
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss by way of declinatory exception for lack 
of jurisdiction rationae materiae on the grounds that section 438 of the AIAOD 
excludes civil remedies for employment injuries compensated by the no-fault regime. 
The section states: 
                                                                                                                                       
the Commission des affaires sociales found that, in principle, psychological trauma is covered by the 
Act but that there was no link between the illness and the workplace on the facts of the case). 
23 Anglade c. Montréal (Communauté urbaine), [1988] D.T.E. 88T-730 (CALP) (confirming 
indemnification of a police officer who suffered depression due to racial harassment at work). See also 
Sauveteurs et victims d’actes criminels—69, [1988] C.A.S. 694 (in which the Commission des affaires 
sociales allowed an indemnification for harassment). See Société canadienne des postes c. C.A.S. (21 
October 1994), Montreal 500-090-01481-894 (C.A.) (confirming an indemnification for harassment). 
24 To avoid the obvious potential confusions, I use the French term “droit commun” here to indicate 
the ius commune, often translated in English as the “common law.” 
25 See e.g. Paquet, supra note 6; Lippel & Demers, supra note 22. 
26 Art. 1053ff. C.C.L.C. (now art. 1457ff. C.C.Q.). 
2006] F. MAKELA – WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPENSATION 33 
 
 
 No worker who has suffered an employment injury may institute a civil 
liability action against his employer by reason of his employment injury.27 
The Superior Court rejected the motion, saying that even though some compensatory 
damages were precluded, the court had jurisdiction to hear a claim for moral and 
“exemplary” (punitive) damages.28 This decision was confirmed by a divided bench 
on appeal,29 and an appeal from that decision was filed to the Supreme Court.30  
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
 On behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Gonthier dismissed the 
appeal, finding that the AIAOD extinguishes the right to all civil remedies for 
workplace injuries, including punitive damages for discriminatory harassment. 
 At the heart of the decision is the analysis of the second paragraph of section 49 
of the Quebec Charter, which provides for punitive damages in cases of intentional 
and illegal violations of a protected right.31 Justice Gonthier found that this second 
paragraph is dependent on the first paragraph of the same section, which provides for 
compensatory damages. Unlike the Canadian common law of torts,32 violation of a 
right protected by the Quebec Charter is a fault that engages civil liability for any 
damages suffered as a consequence of the violation. Thus, since the remedy in the 
first paragraph of section 49 of the Quebec Charter is coextensive with civil 
remedies, and since civil remedies are displaced by the AIAOD, the Quebec Charter 
remedy is also displaced.33 Furthermore, since an award of punitive damages under 
the second paragraph of section 49 is dependent on the award of compensatory 
 
27 AIAOD, supra note 4, s. 438. 
28 Béliveau-St-Jacques c. Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc. (17 April 
1989), Saint-François (Sherbrooke) 450-05-000524-880 (C.S.). 
29 Béliveau-St-Jacques c. Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc., [1991] 
R.J.Q. 279 (C.A.) [Béliveau-St-Jacques (Appeal)]. 
30 Though the employer desisted after receiving leave to appeal, Ms. Béliveau-St-Jacques filed a 
motion to continue the appeal, which was granted. It is for this reason that Ms. Béliveau-St-Jacques is 
the appellant. Ironically, had she not filed to continue, the Court of Appeal’s decision to allow her 
claim for punitive damages would have stood. 
31 Though punitive damages are generally foreign to the civil law, they can be claimed in cases 
where specifically provided for by statute. See art. 1621 C.C.Q. See also Pierre-Gabriel Jobin with 
Nathalie Vézina, Baudouin et Jobin: Les obligations, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005) at 
paras. 875-77. 
32 Compare Seneca College v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193. In this 
decision, the Court found that violation of a protected right is not in itself an actionable tort 
independent from the underlying conduct that constitutes the violation. See generally Lippel & 
Demers, supra note 22 at 7 for a comparison of the common law of torts and Quebec civil liability 
with regard to violations of fundamental rights. 
33 Béliveau-St-Jacques, supra note 2 at 408-10. 
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damages under the first paragraph, and since the compensatory damages are displaced 
by the AIAOD, punitive damages are also displaced.34 
 It should be noted that the judgment did not pronounce on the definition of sexual 
harassment, nor was it found that sexual harassment suffered at work constitutes a 
compensable workplace injury under the AIAOD.35 Invoking the fact that the review 
board decision was not contested, Justice Gonthier begins his judgment by claiming 
that he will “assume that sexual harassment and harassment in the workplace may be 
the basis for a claim to the CSST under the AIAOD.”36  
C. Consequences: Intentional Harassment as Accident 
 Béliveau-St-Jacques has significant consequences both in the law and in the lives 
of women. Despite Justice Gonthier’s explicit refusal to decide whether injury 
suffered as a result of sexual harassment in the workplace is covered by the AIAOD, 
the judgment is seen as a confirmation of the nascent trend to compensate for 
harassment.37 The implications of sexual harassment falling under the rubric of 
“employment injury” are varied, and feminists can reasonably disagree about their 
desirability. 
  First, one might regard the decision as long-overdue judicial recognition of the 
systemic nature of sexual harassment in the workplace. On this reasoning, it is a step 
away from the gendered nature of the AIAOD regime, extending its application to the 
specific forms of injury suffered by women. The concepts of industrial injury and 
occupational disease in the statute are gendered, in that they are based on a 
conception of the workplace as a neutral terrain where dangers to workers are found 
in objects (e.g., machinery, chemicals, etc.). This conception belies the everyday 
reality of many women who experience the workplace as constitutively hostile, not 
because it is some distinctive site of oppression, but because it is embedded within 
the social structures and relations of a patriarchal society.38 Thus, including 
compensation for women who suffer injuries due to this aspect of the workplace may 
be a step forward.  
 Conversely, it may appear illogical to bring intentional violations of fundamental 
rights within the ambit of a no-fault insurance scheme. On a symbolic level, it is 
tantamount to legal recognition of workplace harassment as being the normative 
 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Paquet, supra note 6 at 126ff.  
36 Béliveau-St-Jacques, supra note 2 at 398. 
37 This view is not necessarily wrong. Since the Supreme Court cannot err as to jurisdiction, its 
deference to the administrative tribunal should be interpreted as affirming that no jurisdictional error 
was made. Thus, despite Gonthier J.’s statement, it appears that the judgment implicitly accepts the 
trend as, at a minimum, not patently unreasonable. 
38 See e.g. Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 10-11. But see Lucie Lamarche, “Définition du 
harcèlement sexuel prohibé sur les lieux de travail en droit canadien” (1986) 2 Rev. jur. femme dr. 
113. 
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equivalent of industrial accidents and occupational diseases. Thus, getting harassed is 
just like getting your hand caught in a machine: an unfortunate accident. Evidently 
this shifts attention away from the harasser and from the environment in which 
harassment is made possible or even facilitated.39 
 Another consequence of the decision is the differential juridical treatment that 
harassed workers are subject to, which depends exclusively on the impact of the 
harassment on the victim. Women who are harassed but, for whatever reason, do not 
suffer from effects that are expressible as a medical diagnosis, retain the full panoply 
of civil recourses, including punitive damages. Victims who are diagnosed with a 
medical condition caused by the harassment are limited to the indemnity provided by 
the AIAOD. Thus, it is arguably those who suffer the most who are compensated the 
least.40 Of course, the decision also raises the question of differential treatment of 
women who are harassed in the workplace and those who are harassed elsewhere.41  
 Even more perverse is the incentive structure that this sets up for potential 
harassers. The vicarious liability regime of the civil law42 does not apply to punitive 
damages under section 49 of the Quebec Charter.43 Thus, if the harassment does not 
constitute a workplace injury, the victim retains civil recourse not only against the 
employer but also against the harasser. On the other hand, if the harassment results in 
an injury, then the harasser (and not only the employer) is completely insulated by 
section 442 of the AIAOD, which prohibits actions against other employees covered 
by the regime.44 The lesson for harassers is: “If you’re going to harass, you better 
make sure it hurts, lest you be liable!” 
D. Expansion of the Doctrine 
 There was considerable confusion within legal circles upon the reception of the 
Béliveau-St-Jacques decision.45 Most important among them was the question as to 
the scope of the exclusion of civil remedies for the violation of fundamental rights 
suffered in the workplace. Is the civil recourse extinguished only if the victim is 
indemnified, or is it the possibility of indemnification that displaces other remedies?46 
 
39 See e.g. Paquet, supra note 6 at 150-51. See generally Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 10ff. 
(arguing that human rights tribunals are more suited to dealing with sexual harassment). 
40 See Drapeau, supra note 21 at 196-98.  
41 See Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 11-12. See also Béliveau-St-Jacques (Appeal), supra note 
29, Mailhot, J.A. 
42 Art. 1463 C.C.Q. 
43 See Louis Perret, “De l’impact de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne sur le droit civil 
des contrats et de la responsabilité au Québec” (1981) 12 R.G.D. 121 at 140, n. 48. 
44 Supra note 4, s. 442. See Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 31. 
45 See generally Lippel & Demers, ibid. 
46 See ibid. at 25. 
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 This question was definitively answered by the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
Genest v. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse.47 The 
complainant in this case was sexually harassed by her employer and sought 
psychiatric treatment for the ensuing suffering. After taking sick leave, she eventually 
resigned on the advice of her psychiatrist. She filed an action at the Commission des 
droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, which was then referred to the 
Tribunal des droits de la personne.48 The tribunal claimed jurisdiction on the grounds 
that the complainant had not been indemnified by the CSST and that therefore section 
438 of the AIAOD, as interpreted in Béliveau-St-Jacques, did not apply. In addition to 
compensatory damages, the tribunal awarded $2,000 in punitive damages and ordered 
the harasser to write a letter of apology.  
 The Court of Appeal reversed the tribunal’s decision on the following grounds: 
 La prohibition de recours multiples contre l’employeur d’une victime de 
lésion professionnelle ne saurait découler du choix de cette dernière de recourir 
ou non à l’indemnisation en vertu de la LATMP. Cette option ne lui est pas 
offerte puisque l’article 438 LATMP lui défend d’intenter une action en 
responsabilité civile en raison de sa lésion professionnelle. Toute autre 
interprétation aurait pour effet de rendre optionnel le régime d’indemnisation de 
la LATMP et de contourner l’interdiction énoncée à l’article précité.49 
The court confirmed that the exclusion, as interpreted in Béliveau-St-Jacques, only 
applies to civil liability, and that other remedies such as orders and injunctions are not 
displaced.50 This must have been cold comfort for the complainant, since the court 
went on to say that an order to write a letter of apology is “too vague” to be enforced 
and therefore overturned this aspect of the tribunal’s decision as well.51 
 Whether the courts’ expansive interpretation of the exclusion of civil liability in 
favour of the integrity of the workplace accident regime accurately represents the 
intention of the legislator at the time section 438 of the AIAOD was adopted is, of 
course, open for debate. What is clear, however, is that this approach has now been 
entrenched by legislation. The new psychological harassment provisions of the 
Labour Standards Act52 leave no doubt as to the legislator’s desire to see the AIAOD 
take jurisdictional precedence with respect to awards of damages.53 As soon as a 
commissioner of the Commission des relations du travail (or arbitrator in the case of 
 
47 [2001] AZ-50082198 (Azimut), D.T.E. 2001T-99 (C.A.) [Genest cited to Azimut], leave to appeal 
to S.C.C. refused, [2001] 2 S.C.R. vii. 
48 Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c. Genest (1997), R.J.Q. 1488, 
D.T.E. 97T-509 (T.D.P.Q.). 
49 Genest, supra note 47 at para. 20. 
50 Ibid. at para. 22. 
51 Ibid. at para. 24. 
52 R.S.Q. c. N-1.1, ss. 81.18-20, 123.6-16.  
53 Ibid. s. 123.16, para. 1. 
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unionized workplaces54) determines that it is probable that an alleged case of 
harassment entailed an employment injury within the meaning of the AIOAD, 
jurisdiction over all monetary remedies must be reserved but not exercised until the 
CSST has decided the question.55  
III. Regulating Victims 
 The decision in Béliveau-St-Jacques and its subsequent expansion in Genest 
radically change the focus of legal responses to sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Whereas, for all its failings,56 the civil liability approach directs attention to the 
actions of the harasser, the workplace accident compensation regime posits the victim 
as the site of regulation. More specifically, the victim becomes the object of a 
Kafkaesque57 medico-legal administrative machine populated by experts whose job it 
is to diagnose and compensate injury, rather than the subject of a legal structure that 
recognizes and remedies the wrong that was done to her. The feelings of distress, 
anguish, and alienation that can result from being victimized by reason of one’s sex 
are transformed into symptoms of mental illness for the purposes of indemnification.58  
 This section will proceed in three steps: first, I will provide a brief outline of the 
actual functioning of CSST claims; second, I will argue that this process is an 
example of what Foucault calls “disciplinary discourse”, through which individual 
subjects are constituted as the objects of a regime; finally, I will draw a parallel with 
nineteenth-century theories of women’s bodies, maintaining that the CSST regime 
reproduces the conception of women’s bodies as canvasses on which their emotional 
life is painted. 
A. The CSST as Castle 
 Workers who the CSST determines have suffered an employment injury, defined 
as “an injury or disease arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident, or an 
occupational disease,”59 are entitled to an income replacement indemnity equal to 
 
54 Ibid. s. 81.20. The application of this section to s. 123.16, para. 2 provides that the labour 
arbitrator must reserve jurisdiction when he or she “considers it probable” that the psychological 
harassment led to an employment injury within the meaning of the AIAOD. 
55 Ibid. s. 123.16, para. 2. 
56 See generally Conaghan & Mansell, supra note 11.  
57 Of particular interest is that, during the time he wrote the novels The Trial and The Castle, Franz 
Kafka worked in the statistical and claims department of the Workman’s Accident Insurance Institute 
in Prague. For a description of how Kafka viewed his work at the Institute, see Ernst Pawel, The 
Nightmare of Reason: A Life of Franz Kafka (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1984) at 190. 
58 See Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 2.  
59 AIAOD, supra note 4, s. 2. 
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ninety per cent of their net annual salary.60 In order to collect this indemnity, however, 
the worker must follow a protracted medico-legal procedure.  
 The worker must first consult a medical professional (called the “physician in 
charge”), who must fill out a series of CSST forms attesting to the diagnosis, 
treatment (if any), and expected date of return to work.61 The CSST may then require 
a further examination by a health professional of its designation, to which the worker 
must submit.62 The employer also has the right to have the worker evaluated by a 
medical professional of the employer’s choosing.63 Once again, the worker must 
submit to such an examination.64 If either the CSST’s or the employer’s designated 
professional disagrees with any aspect of the reports submitted by the physician in 
charge, then forms attesting to the disagreement and the reasons therefore are 
submitted to the Bureau d’évaluation médicale.65 Once in possession of the totality of 
the diagnoses and reports, the Bureau d’évaluation médicale either confirms or 
quashes the diagnosis and other findings of the physician in charge.66 The decision of 
the Bureau d’évaluation médicale binds the CSST. Note that the existence of a causal 
relation between the injury diagnosed (if any) and the workplace is not decided by 
any of these medical instances—only the medical condition that will serve as the 
basis for the claim is determined.67  
 Once the initial medical steps are taken, the CSST determines whether the worker 
is eligible for compensation. In doing so, the diagnosis of the physician in charge (if 
uncontested), or the Bureau d’évaluation médicale (if contested), is only one aspect 
to be considered. The CSST must also find that the injury arose from, or in the course 
of, employment.68 Should any interested party disagree with the decision of the CSST, 
an application for review may be brought before an internal administrative review 
board.69 If any interested party disagrees with the review, an appeal lies with the 
Commission des lésions professionnelles (“CLP”).70 The CLP has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals,71 but as with any administrative tribunal, applications for 
judicial review may be made at the Superior Court in accordance with the normal 
 
60 Ibid. s. 45. 
61 Ibid. ss. 199-203. 
62 Ibid. s. 204. 
63 Ibid. s. 209. 
64 Ibid. s. 210. 
65 Ibid. s. 212.1. 
66 Ibid. s. 221. 
67 Ibid. s. 212 a contrario. 
68 Ibid. ss. 2, 27-31.  
69 Ibid. ss. 358-358.5. 
70 Ibid. ss. 359, 429.22. 
71 Ibid. s. 369. 
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principles of administrative law.72 The CLP also has limited powers to review its own 
decisions.73  
B. Foucault and the Medicalization of Dignity 
 Subsequent to Béliveau-St-Jacques, commentators expressed concern that the 
consequence would be the increased medicalization of sexual harassment victims.74 
The process described above illustrates the extent of this significant problem. One 
explanation is that increased medicalization is the regrettable result of a particular 
interpretation of a specific piece of legislation. Such a descriptive claim, however, 
does little to explain the phenomenon. A more satisfying explanation would situate 
the trend towards medicalization within a historical context. 
 Foucault argues that one of the unique aspects of modern society is the way in 
which institutions such as schools, hospitals, and prisons constitute their subjects.75 
Through the process of observation, description, and classification, individuals 
become “cases” that can be understood and therefore administered.76 Thus, in contrast 
with the medieval subjects of a sovereign, members of modern societies are the 
objects of administration. The power of the state is not exercised by exceptional acts 
punishing the disobedient, but rather through the everyday acts of disciplining the 
obedient. 
 Compare the CSST procedure outlined in the previous section to Foucault’s 
description of the “case”: 
Le cas, ce n’est plus, comme dans la casuistique ou la jurisprudence, un 
ensemble de circonstances qualifiant un acte et pouvant modifier l’application 
d’une règle, c’est l’individu tel qu’on peut le décrire, le jauger, le mesurer, le 
comparer à d’autres et cela dans son individualité même ; et c’est aussi 
l’individu qu’on a à dresser ou redresser, qu’on a à classer, à normaliser, à 
exclure, etc.77 
All of the characteristics that Foucault points out as characterizing the case are found 
in the CSST procedure. The victim must first be described (through the doctors’ 
diagnoses), then these descriptions are compared (at the Bureau d’évaluation 
médicale), and measured according to the standards set out by the regulations (by the 
CSST). Justice Gonthier, in his summary of the facts, describes the outcome of Ms. 
Béliveau-St-Jacques’ evaluation as follows: 
 
72 See ibid. s. 429.59 and arts. 33, 834-46 C.C.P. See also R.A. Macdonald, “Absence of 
Jurisdiction: A Perspective” (1983) 43 R. du B. 307 at 349-51 for a particularly poignant example of 
the concrete effects that jurisdictional challenges have on CSST claimants.  
73 Ss. 429.56-429.57. See Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail c. Fontaine, [2005] 
R.J.Q. 2203, 2005 QCCA 775 for a discussion of the CLP’s powers to review its own decisions.  
74 See e.g. Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 2. 
75 See Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
76 See ibid. at 186-96, especially 193-94. 
77 Ibid. at 193. 
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She ... received compensation for bodily injury ... established on the basis of a 
permanent impairment percentage of 18 percent. The CSST found that she had 
sustained an anatomicophysiological deficit of 15 percent and suffering and 
loss of enjoyment of life resulting from that deficit of 3 percent.78 
What is described, measured, compared, and ultimately judged by the CSST is not an 
instance of sexual harassment. In fact, the CSST has no jurisdiction to even 
pronounce on the existence of such a state of affairs, since it only asks if there is a 
link between the workplace and the accident.79 Instead, the procedure centres on the 
true site of regulation: the victim. 
 The effects of a procedure that regulates victims rather than judging states of 
affairs are manifold. First, there is the impact on the actual individuals forced to 
navigate the process. Having suffered affronts to their human dignity, they must 
submit to a series of tests, examinations, diagnoses, and judicial procedures. The 
ability to name what happened to them (harassment, violation, etc.) is appropriated by 
the medico-legal technocracy. As if any evidence were needed to support the 
proposition that this process is detrimental to those who undergo it, we need look no 
further than the circumstances surrounding the Béliveau-St-Jacques decision. 
Subsequent to the CSST ruling and the initial civil proceedings, Ms. Béliveau-St-
Jacques found herself again in front of the CSST. This time, she sought compensation 
for a relapse in her symptoms caused by the administrative and judicial process 
itself.80 
 One might argue, nevertheless, that what Foucault describes is the unfortunate 
but necessary result of the “historical compromise”81 that characterizes the CSST, or 
of no-fault regimes generally. It could also be maintained that even administrative 
regimes that allow for fault-based liability have the ironic tendency to reproduce the 
very byzantine rule-structures that they were meant to replace through 
dejudicialization.82 But there is a significant difference between these cases and the 
medicalization of sexual harassment victims. In the latter instance, it is a specific 
subset of the population (i.e., mostly women)83 who are (re)victimized by the 
disciplining discourse. It is to this aspect of the problem that we now turn. 
 
78 Béliveau-St-Jacques, supra note 2 at 392. 
79 See Drapeau, supra note 21 at 194-95. 
80 Béliveau c. C.S.N., [1993] C.A.L.P. 1571. 
81 See Part I, above, for more on this topic. 
82 See e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field”, trans. 
by Richard Terdimen (1987) 38 Hastings L.J. 805 at 836-37 (on the judicialization of labour 
arbitration boards). See also Charles Dickens, Bleak House (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1948) for a 
fictional account of the complexity of the English Courts of Equity.  
83 See generally Lippel & Demers, supra note 22. 
2006] F. MAKELA – WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPENSATION 41 
 
 
C. The Hysterical Turn 
 Women live their emotional life bodily. Destined by their instincts and bound by 
their hormones, they do not fit within the Cartesian model of the self that divides 
body from soul and emotion from reason. Such thinking has a long history both in the 
domains of psychology and of law. Early treatment of “hysteria” in women often 
consisted in the medical application of vibrators,84 since mental illness in women was 
thought to be directly linked to their embodied sexual nature.85 In the common law, 
the gradual judicial recognition of psychological damages started with cases of 
miscarriage, euphemistically described as “nervous shock”.86  
 However far we may believe we have come from these absurd and antiquated 
views, they may very well underlie the jurisprudential development of 
indemnification for workplace harassment. As I noted above,87 the notion that 
psychological injury could be compensable under workplace accident legislation was 
accepted at the same time that the first such act was passed in Quebec, almost a 
century ago. Yet it was not until relatively recently, after women began to occupy a 
significant portion of the paid workforce and the problem of harassment had been 
named,88 that such claims began to be filed at—and recognized by—the CSST. 
 I am not, of course, suggesting that the commissioners and judges who developed 
the jurisprudence consciously accepted the idea that women’s bodies and emotional 
life are necessarily linked. Evidently, advances in medical science have made the 
civilian category of moral damages increasingly problematic, as the physical basis for 
emotional life became better understood. Nevertheless, the idea is subtly entrenched 
in our society’s conceptions of the ways in which women and men experience 
affronts to their integrity. This is particularly striking when contrasted with the 
residual category of moral damages unrecognized by the CSST, and therefore 
insulated from the AIAOD’s displacement of civil remedies: damage to reputation. 
IV. Private Injuries and Public Harms 
 The distinction between the “male” public realm of business and politics and the 
“female” private realm of the home and family is not a neutral natural phenomenon. 
 
84 See generally Rachel P. Maines, The Technology of Orgasm: "Hysteria," the Vibrator, and 
Women’s Sexual Satisfaction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
85 See e.g. W.H.R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory of 
the Psycho-neuroses (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1922); C. Jung, Psychological 
Types, trans. by H.G. Baynes & R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 
86 See e.g. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, “Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A 
History” (1990) 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814. 
87 See Parts II-III, above. 
88 See e.g. Lippel & Demers, supra note 22 at 10-12. See also MacKinnon, Harassment, supra note 1. 
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Many feminists have pointed out that the distinction is partially constituted and 
reinforced by the operation of the law, which is both gendered and gendering.89 
 If we focus on the phenomenon of legal treatment of sexual harassment in the 
workplace, problematizing the public/private split does not immediately yield an 
explanation. On the traditional view of the distinction, virtually all workplace 
harassment is public by definition, since the workplace is paradigmatically public.90 
If, however, we work from the insight that an important feature of the legal response 
to harassment is the regulation of victims, then the private or public nature of the 
harm caused by harassment provides the basis for a trenchant critique.  
A. The Defamation Double Standard 
 Unlike the common law of torts, there is no specific action for defamation under 
the civil law.91 Defamation is covered by the general regime of civil liability,92 though 
the specific right to the respect of one’s reputation that grounds an action in civil 
liability is found both in the Civil Code of Quebec93 and in the Quebec Charter.94 As 
with any civil liability claim, physical, material, and moral damages can be awarded 
in an action based on defamation.95 Arguably, an extra measure of quasi-
compensatory damages for “non-pecuniary loss” makes awards for damage to 
 
89 See generally Regina Graycar & Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (Sydney: Federation 
Press, 2002) c. 2. Carole Pateman has argued that the public/private dichotomy is the central question 
of feminist theorizing: see Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 
1989) c. 6. See also Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform” (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (claiming that the persistence of the dichotomy has limited the 
effectiveness of reform efforts geared towards achieving gender equality as well as limited the range 
of possible reforms). But see Tracy E. Higgins, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist 
Theorizing” (2000) 75 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 847 (arguing that the threat to equality posed by the 
public/private distinction has been overstated by feminists but that it is an important theoretical tool, 
especially when used to ground a more overarching critique of state power). 
90 Such an analysis may nevertheless be useful if we take into account the gendered nature of work 
highlighting, for example, ways in which harassment may be more prevalent in “private” workplaces 
such as childcare and other “domestic” work. 
91 See Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 115, 2002 SCC 85 for a 
discussion of the difference between the common law and the civil law on defamation. 
92 See Devoir inc. c. Centre de psychologie préventive et de développement humain G.S.M. inc., 
[1999] R.R.A. 17 (Q.C.A.). 
93 Arts. 3 and 35 C.C.Q. See also art. 2929 C.C.Q. This provision, specifying when prescription 
period begins to run, is the only place in the Civil Code of Quebec where the term “defamation” is 
used. The French version refers to “atteinte à la réputation”. 
94 Supra note 3, s. 4 (protecting “dignity, honour, and reputation”). 
95 Art. 1457 C.C.Q. 
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reputation particularly high.96 Furthermore, punitive damages under the second 
paragraph of section 49 of the Quebec Charter are also available. 
 Given the broad scope accorded to the exclusion of civil remedies in Béliveau-St-
Jacques and the expansive reading of section 438 of the AIOAD in Genest,97 one 
would expect that damage to reputation caused by workplace incidents would be 
excluded in the same way. Indeed, defendants in defamation cases began invoking 
Genest as the grounds for a motion to dismiss raised by declinatory exception shortly 
after it was decided.98 These were unsuccessful, but the question of whether 
defamation can constitute a workplace accident was not squarely answered, since the 
motions were denied on other grounds.99 
 When the issue was finally put directly to the Court of Appeal, the Genest 
analysis was rejected. Thus, in deciding Parent c. Rayle,100 the Court of Appeal 
introduced a double standard shielding defamation from the exclusionary regime. The 
plaintiff, a management member of a school board, was the subject of a scathing 
article in the teachers’ union newsletter, written by the union’s president. Claiming 
damage to her reputation, she filed an action in the Superior Court. When it was 
revealed in pre-trial discovery that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with depressive 
anxiety as a result of the alleged defamation, the defendant immediately filed a 
motion to dismiss. The court, it was argued, must decline jurisdiction and refer the 
case to the CSST, which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the incident 
constitutes a workplace injury. The argument was not accepted by the Superior Court, 
and the defendant appealed. 
 In a surprisingly short judgment, the Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court’s 
decision, finding that the intention of the legislator could not have been to include 
defamation in the workplace accident compensation scheme. The case is 
distinguished from Genest on the grounds that in that case, the parties had agreed that 
the incident in question constituted a workplace injury that would have been 
 
96 See Lafferty, Harwood & Partners c. Parizeau, [2003] R.J.Q. 2758, R.R.A. 1145 (C.A.) 
[Parizeau cited to R.J.Q.], leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2004] 1 S.C.R., but discontinued (8 
February 2005) S.C.C. Bulletin of Proceedings. 
97 Supra note 47. 
98 See Dufour c. Syndicat des employées et employés du centre d’accueil Pierre-Joseph Triest 
(C.S.N.), [1999] R.J.Q. 2674, R.J.D.T. 1559 (C.S.) [Dufour cited to R.J.Q.]; Protestant School Board 
of Greater Montreal c. Williams, [2002] R.R.A. 1060, D.T.E. 2002T-1010 (Q.C.A.) [Williams cited to 
R.R.A.]; Kupelian c. Nortel Networks Corp., [2002] AZ-50118045 (Azimut), D.T.E. 2002T-377 (C.S.) 
[Kupelian cited to Azimut]. 
99 See Williams, ibid. at paras. 57-58 (declinatory exception raised on valid grounds but prescription 
had run out and it would be inequitable to leave the plaintiff without a remedy). See also Kupelian, 
ibid. at paras. 8-11, 16-19 (declinatory exception raised on valid grounds for all heads of recovery 
except defamation, which was not factually linked). But see Dufour, ibid. (the Court found there was 
no workplace injury on the facts).  
100 [2003] R.J.Q. 6, R.J.D.T. 1 (C.A.) [Parent cited to R.J.Q.]. 
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compensable had it been filed at the CSST. Here, the question of whether it was a 
workplace injury was a question at trial.  
 The core of the decision is based on the same reasoning that underlies one of the 
critiques of Béliveau-St-Jacques:101 
... [L]’interprétation proposée nous conduirait à des situations pour le moins 
déraisonnables ou inéquitables. En effet, si un travailleur est diffamé par un 
collègue de travail et qu’il en résulte anxiété ou détresse requérant un suivi 
médical, son seul recours sera de s’adresser à la CSST, car il en découlerait une 
lésion professionnelle ... Qui plus est, si la diffamation ne crée pas chez lui une 
atteinte permanente, il n’aura droit à aucun dommage moral et encore moins à 
des dommages punitifs. Par contre, si ce travailleur continue de bien se porter, 
physiquement et psychologiquement, il pourra réclamer non seulement des 
dommages moraux pour atteinte à sa réputation et même possiblement des 
dommages punitifs si l’atteinte était intentionnelle ... En somme, la diffamation 
qui détruit l’individu pourrait valoir moins que celle qui porte uniquement 
ombrage à sa réputation.102 
The court went on to say that defamation is not necessarily excluded from the 
AIAOD; this is up to the CSST to decide. Relying on Kupelian,103 it pronounced that 
the courts of general jurisdiction enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the CSST over 
defamation.104 
B. Dignity for Some 
 The consequences of the decision in Parent have not yet been felt and it is 
possible that it may have a beneficial impact. The apparent narrowing of Genest 
could be the source of arguments for future victims of workplace sexual harassment 
who, for whatever reason, prefer judicial recognition of the harm that was done to 
them over administrative compensation for their inability to work. 
 More likely, however, given the specific reliance on Kupelian, is that defamation 
will continue to constitute a narrow exception to the exclusion of civil remedies under 
the AIAOD. This would be unsurprising, given the analysis of the development of 
CSST recognition of psychological injury as related to the “nature” of women. 
 Though the moral damages that one can claim for harassment (when not excluded 
by the AIAOD) and defamation are both based on reparation for harm to dignity,105 the 
notion of dignity at play is radically different. The first kind of dignity is solipsistic 
and individualized. A woman who has had her dignity violated, in the eyes of the law, 
has been harmed in her self-regard. Since affront to dignity is a private experience 
lived inside the head of the victim, it is also amenable to the kind of medicalization 
 
101 For further discussion of the critique of Béliveau-St-Jacques, see 10-11, above. 
102 Parent, supra note 100 at para. 24 [footnotes omitted]. 
103 Supra note 98. 
104 Parent, supra note 100 at para. 29. 
105 See e.g. Quebec Charter, supra note 3, s. 4. 
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described in previous sections. The second kind of dignity is externalized in the 
community. A man who had his reputation violated, in the eyes of the law, has been 
harmed in the regard of others. Since affront to reputation is a public experience lived 
in minds of others, it is not amenable to medicalization. 
 I have sharpened the point somewhat by describing the bearers of dignity and 
reputation rights as being women and men respectively. Of course, both genders have 
formal equal protection of both sets of rights (and in fact, the plaintiffs in Parent and 
Nortel were both women). Nevertheless, there are at least two serious critiques of the 
decision based on feminist grounds.  
 First, whether men and women have formal equal rights is somewhat beside the 
point. The legal system only decides the cases before it, and the field of possible 
cases is determined by the situations in which people find themselves before 
litigation. As a matter of empirical fact, we still live in a society where women are 
sexually harassed much more often than men, and where men are arguably more 
likely to have a professional reputation to protect. The former are medicalized in the 
administrative regime and denied civil remedies, whereas the latter have access to 
substantial106 compensatory and punitive damages.  
 A second, related problem with the distinction is its operation on the symbolic 
level. The law is an important constitutor of social norms and thus its 
pronouncements are performative in ways that affect more than just the parties at bar. 
Thus, not only do the victims of sexual harassment find themselves with an 
attenuated recourse, but all women are harmed by the law effectively saying: “If you 
have been harassed you must be sick, but if you have been defamed you have been 
harmed.” 
Conclusion 
 Civil liability is an imperfect system. Fraught with injustices and inconsistencies, 
it attempts to reduce varied forms of social conflict and individual suffering to a small 
set of comparable features that can be ultimately translated into monetary terms. 
Much is inevitably lost in the process. Workplace injury insurance schemes are also 
imperfect. As in the case of civil liability, compensation is often insufficient, and—
despite the ideal—the process of administration can be as complex and dehumanizing 
as the fault-based liability structures that were replaced.  
 In Quebec, women who are victims of sexual harassment in the workplace are 
subjected to the worst aspects of both systems. Unfortunately, this is not a reflection 
 
106 See e.g. Parizeau, supra note 96 where the Court of Appeal increased the damages awarded at 
the Superior Court to a total of $100,000 per plaintiff. See also Rayle c. Parent, [2002] D.T.E. 2002T-
541, AZ-50127086 (Azimut) (C.S.) in which the Superior Court decided the merits subsequent to the 
Court of Appeal determining that it had jurisdiction to do so. See Parent, supra note 100 where the 
court awarded $30,000 in moral damages and $20,000 in punitive (exemplary) damages. 
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of an imperfect legislative scheme that could be corrected with careful drafting or 
creative interpretation. Instead, as I have attempted to illustrate, it is the reflection of a 
society that has yet to eliminate the underlying prejudices and presuppositions that 
accompany the systemic devaluation of women and their experiences. 
    
 
